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The emergence of blockchain projects enables new 
ways of collaboration between untrusted parties. Each 
of these projects, however, only exists because 
stakeholders of these projects find common ground. If 
this common ground is not found, blockchains are 
forked – organizationally and technically – which 
endangered major blockchain systems like Bitcoin or 
Ethereum. To assure the operation of such projects and, 
thus, to improve their governance, it is crucial to 
understand their stakeholders. This research conducted 
a literature review and a survey to (1) identify 
blockchain stakeholders and to (2) understand their 
interests as well as underlying motives for their 
interests. This research has two main contributions: a 
stakeholder map, which serves as a lens to study 
stakeholders of public blockchains, and exemplary 
insights from the application of this lens comprising of 
74 survey responses. Consequently, this research 
provides a novel tool for stakeholder analysis in 
academia and practice to improve blockchain 
governance. 
1. Introduction 
Within the past few years, public blockchain 
projects such as cryptocurrencies have managed to 
change our perception of prevailing economic and 
organizational infrastructures. They allow radical new 
ways of collaboration between untrusted parties, largely 
bypassing centralized intermediaries. Above all, Bitcoin 
(BTC) represents one of the first effectively realized 
attempts to eliminate the central party in a transaction-
based financial system. As an implicit response to the 
global financial crisis of 2007-2008, BTC seeks to 
supersede the need for trust in such central fiduciary 
institutions by operating as a so-called trust-less 
technology [1]. Ultimately, the BTC project rendered 
one premise: “[…] to solve issues of social coordination 
and economic exchange by relying, only and 
exclusively, on technical means” [2, p. 1]. This shall be 
enabled by shifting the controlling instance, which 
oversees transactions between untrusted parties, away 
from centralized institutions (such as banks) to a 
technology-based solution (in this case, a blockchain 
enabled distributed-ledger system). By concept, this 
leads to a general independence of centrally governed 
infrastructures, as stakeholders in such peer-to-peer 
(P2P) networks rely mostly on their inherent 
technological regulations. 
A closer look at the allegedly distributed, 
technocratic governance of established cryptocurrencies 
reveals, however, that expectations regarding 
decentralization do not necessarily coincide with reality. 
These projects often have an underlying autocratic-
mechanistic power structure [2, 3]. Demagogic public 
appearances, exertion of influence based on technical 
expertise, and publicly held disputes about the future 
development of such projects allow certain key figures 
to emerge as central so-called benevolent dictators [4, 
5]. The formation of interest groups, where contributed 
resources are consolidated (such as hash-power in 
mining pools), reveals another problematic distribution 
of centralized power in systems, whose primary 
intention is to use a decentrally-governed infrastructure 
[6]. Lastly, large cryptocurrencies experienced various 
harsh conflicts, which endangered their existence; often 
these conflicts led to splits, so-called forks, within these 
projects [2]. 
The root of these problems lies in the formal 
independence of stakeholders in blockchain systems. 
Public blockchain projects consist of several, formally 
independent participants, for example developers and 
validators, to develop, maintain, and run their systems. 
At the same time, every stakeholder might have 
different interests around a blockchain system, with the 
consequence of divergent expectations about how such 
a system should be built or run. This is particularly 
important as, when this common ground among 
stakeholders is missing, blockchain projects fork both 
organizationally (split of communities underpinned to 
each blockchain project) and technically (creation of a 
new, incompatible ledger). To illustrate these interests, 
also considering recent blockchain developments [7], 





one might ask, what a blockchain stakeholder primarily 
cares about: a token’s price or technical evolution? Do 
individuals mind technological decisions? Are they 
involved in decision-making? Do they even want to be 
involved in decision-making? To safeguard and align 
incentives and interests of different stakeholders plays a 
key factor for such decentralized projects to persist [8, 
9, 10, 11], which is at the heart of the research stream of 
blockchain governance. 
Against the background shown above, this research, 
in line with several other researchers [12, 13], argues 
that blockchain stakeholders are not sufficiently 
understood in current research on blockchain 
governance. A grounded understanding of blockchain 
stakeholders is, at the same time, a prerequisite for 
blockchain systems to prevail as it allows to develop or 
adjust a blockchain’s governance structures. As of now, 
there are several approaches in literature that try to 
capture these complex governance structures among 
stakeholders in public blockchains [2, 9, 10, 11]. To 
improve the understanding of stakeholders of public 
blockchains and, consequently, to improve their 
governance, this research shows first a classification of 
such stakeholders and then shows their interests, their 
motivations behind their interests, and the design 
features of blockchains they were particularly interested 
in. Consequently, our research was guided by the 
following research questions: 
 
RQ1: What are the stakeholders of public and 
permissionless blockchain projects? 
RQ2: What are the interests of these stakeholders? 
 
To answer our research questions, this research 
reports from the findings of a literature review and a 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of survey results 
comprising answers of 74 stakeholders of various public 
and permissionless blockchains. 
This paper is structured as follows: section two 
introduces related work on stakeholders in the wider 
frame of blockchain governance. Section three then 
shows our methodological approach regarding 
framework development and operationalization, while 
section four shows the results of the latter. Within 
section five, we contextualize our empirical findings 
against the background of blockchain governance and 
conclude this research in section six. 
2. Related Work 
To introduce relevant concepts to our research, this 
section first introduces views on blockchain 
governance, and, subsequently, highlights the 
importance of a stakeholder-centric view. 
2.1 Views on Blockchain Governance 
There are several approaches in academia that try to 
capture the phenomenon of decentralized governance in 
public blockchain projects. For example, De Filippi and 
Loveluck [2] describe the emerging conflicts within 
communities of public blockchains. Thereby, they 
introduce the distinction between governance by 
infrastructure and governance of the infrastructure. 
Essentially, they explain to which extent consensus can 
be found and maintained by strict technological means, 
i.e., implemented consensus protocols. On the same line 
of thought, Lumineau, Wang, and Schilke [11] examine 
the differences between the governance of blockchain 
and traditional contractual and relational governance. 
They conduct an analysis of blockchain governance to 
further assess its feasibility as a new way of organizing 
collaborations. Against the background of blockchain 
governance, they relate the term cooperation to the 
alignment of interests, whereas aligning expectations is 
associated with coordination [11]. Regarding the 
already mentioned dynamics of interdependent 
stakeholders in public blockchains, they emphasize this 
research’s area of interest by concluding: “We see 
particular interest in analyzing the social construction of 
blockchain governance and in studying how different 
stakeholders shape their design and meaning across 
specific contexts as a function of their resources, 
powers, or capabilities” [11, p. 17]. 
To capture the power dynamics in public 
blockchains Beck, Müller-Bloch, and King [9] extend 
the IT governance framework developed by Weill [8], 
which consists of the three dimensions decision rights, 
accountability, and incentives. Based on this 
framework, they express the importance of aligned 
incentives in such blockchain projects, and their 
corresponding analysis. They outline the consequences 
of a failed consensus finding in this regard as follows: 
“Incentives are absolutely crucial for the blockchain 
economy to function effectively, because incentives are 
necessary to achieve consensus that forms the backbone 
of the blockchain. Unless incentives are properly 
aligned, the nodes [i.e., stakeholders] of the blockchain 
will not contribute to consensus. Improper incentive 
alignment could threaten the integrity of the entire 
blockchain make the blockchain economy untenable” 
[9, p. 1029]. 
Schmeiss, Hoelzle, and Tech [10] tackle the 
governance aspect of public blockchains based on the 
paradox of openness. As such blockchain projects can 
be seen as platform ecosystems, they apply the 
overarching dimensions access, control, and incentives 
in their framework to elaborate the issue of how such 
projects enable maximum openness for mutual 
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innovation while ensuring value capturing for all 
involved stakeholders. 
Lastly, Musiani, Mallard, and Méadel [14] describe 
different facets of user profiles in public blockchains 
and their associated role of shifting such projects 
towards more de- or centralization. Eventually, they 
point out the importance of understanding how different 
stakeholders situate themselves in and behave around 
blockchain projects. 
2.2 The Importance of Stakeholders in 
Blockchain Governance 
This research builds on the abovementioned 
insights and argues that the different views on 
blockchain governance have a common denominator: 
interest alignment among stakeholders plays a crucial 
role in public blockchains. This work therefore aims to 
thoroughly identify existing stakeholders and their 
interests with a higher level of detail than we found in 
present literature, to obtain a sound basis to further 
assess the dynamics within blockchain governance. 
Indeed, the aspect of decentralization in public 
blockchains has two different components: a technical 
and an organizational one. We believe that the 
examination of organizational challenges within 
blockchain communities is not yet concluded, and that a 
suitable model that captures the interest of involved 
stakeholders is needed. Several researchers describe the 
application possibilities, and thus implied stakeholder’s 
needs and expectations of blockchain projects [15]. 
Wingreen, Kavanagh, John Ennis, and Miscione [16] 
aim to capture the value systems behind 
cryptocurrencies and subsequently categorize 
stakeholders in different groups, based on shared values. 
Their categorization, however, does not account for 
overlapping stakeholder types, e.g., stakeholders 
belonging to two of their categories. 
The study of these proposals left the impression of 
properly set approaches, but with a too low granularity 
in used frameworks to adequately mirror the individual 
interdependencies among different stakeholders. An 
often-observed generalization of stakeholder groups, in 
our perspective, distorts the view on stakeholder 
dynamics within public blockchains. Particular interests 
must be captured as such, as virtually every participant, 
i.e., contributing node, decides unilaterally whether to 
participate in a public blockchain project or to withdraw 
committed resources. As described with the paradox of 
openness [10], these particular interests are mirrored in 
the individual value capturing for every partaker in such 
a platform economy. Once more, public blockchains 
rely on the safeguarding and alignment of these 
(deviating) interests of different stakeholders to persist. 
3. Methodology 
In this research, we conducted five steps consisting 
of an (1) literature review, (2) empirical data collection, 
(3) stakeholder map development, (4) survey design and 
conduct, and (5) data analysis. Figure 1. below gives an 
overview of these five activities, which we detail in the 
following one by one. The research was carried out by a 
group of three, with one researcher taking the lead, 
assisted by two senior researchers in recurring review 
and feedback cycles. 
 
Figure 1. Methodology structure 
Literature Review. To eventually conduct a survey 
on blockchain stakeholder interests, at first, we strove to 
understand the current state of a stakeholder-centric 
research within the research stream of blockchain 
governance. Consequently, we created a preliminary 
overview of existing frameworks that addresses 
blockchain stakeholder interests by the means of a 
literature review. Amongst others, we used search terms 
like (public and permissionless) blockchain projects, 
governance discourse, stakeholders, interests, incentive 
schemes and combinations of these to find and narrow 
down relevant literature on academic search engines 
(mainly swisscovery.slsp.ch and scholar.google.com). 
We also utilized already analyzed major incidents like 
the block-size dispute of BTC in literature to reveal 
deviating interests of stakeholders in public 
blockchains. Eventually, our preliminary framework 
relied on the final set of 30 academic papers. 
Empirical Data Collection. To answer our research 
questions, we aimed to develop a model (stakeholder 
map) that shows existing stakeholders (RQ1) and their 
interests and motives (RQ2) in public and 
permissionless blockchain projects. We found that the 
academic literature cannot move with the fast pace with 
which new projects and concepts appear in the field of 
blockchain technology. In this regard, we collected in 
total 32 articles (grey and non-academic literature) on 
dedicated online platforms (mainly medium.com, 
cointelegraph.com, and coindesk.com) to understand 
the actual pulse of blockchain communities in practice. 
This qualitative data, combined with the insights from 
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the preliminary literature review, formed the basis for 
our stakeholder map development. 
Stakeholder Map Development. During an 
iterative coding process, we analyzed our gathered 
articles with an appropriate qualitative data analysis 
software tool called MAXQDA. To build our codebook, 
we used academic literature as a reference for an initial 
framework (top-down). This framework, then, was 
enriched with empirical insights (bottom-up) from our 
empirical data collection. We isolated single aspects, 
such as a single interest, motive, or stakeholder, which 
we eventually embedded and collated in our stakeholder 
map. Following common principles of qualitative data 
analysis, we designed our codebook with great care to 
account for clearly defined, and thus comparable facets 
on the same level of detail. In total, we applied several 
dozens of codes and subcodes to over 30 articles and 
marked over 840 different segments with one or 
multiple codes, defining and delineating all single 
aspects of our stakeholder map. After its development, 
which involved several researchers, we back-tested the 
developed model by conducting another, 
complementary literature review. Eventually, using 
further permutations and alterations of our key search 
queries on different academic databases, we were able 
to omit and collate several of our codes. We did so to 
meet the issue of different sources describing the same 
circumstance with distinct, but conceptually related 
keywords. This formed a first validation of our model. 
Survey Design and Conduct. Our developed 
stakeholder map, which we derived from literature 
(academic, grey, and non-academic), formed the first 
part of our results, and provides us with a preliminary 
answer to our research questions. As a next step, we 
decided to operationalize our model by the means of a 
survey and gather quantifiable data from communities 
of current public blockchains. This approach would 
ultimately form a second validation of our model, as we 
aimed to assess the occurrence and importance 
perception of identified aspects in our stakeholder map. 
We designed the survey to consist of five parts: (1) 
actors (choosing one or multiple roles), (2) drivers 
behind their motivations, (3) design features desired 
from a blockchain system, (4) concluding questions 
(e.g., how conflicts in one’s project were dealt with), 
and (5) demographics. The survey covered both 
quantitative questions by use of a Likert scale and free-
text answers, which were then qualitatively analyzed. 
The survey participants were able to indicate multiple 
aspects which drives them in public blockchains; their 
proportional occurrence is displayed in Table 1. Driver 
distribution in section 4.2 below. To assess the 
importance of interests (Design Features), the 
respondents were asked to rate these aspects using the 
following linear scale: 1 (not important) – 2 – 3 (neutral) 
– 4 - 5 (very important) – 0 (I do not know). These 
averaged, i.e., weighted importance ratings are shown in 
Table 2. Interest distribution (section 4.2). Due to space 
constraints, we cannot describe the survey design in 
detail here; details can be provided upon request. 
The survey was published on over 20 distribution 
channels, which we carefully evaluated to account for 
active public and permissionless blockchain projects 
(mainly online discussion forums, e.g., reddit.com, 
bitcointalk.com, etc.). In these forums, we addressed 
individuals that are actively involved in public and 
permissionless blockchain projects (covering all 
possible actor types in our stakeholder map). 
Stakeholders of private / consortium blockchains were 
not considered for this survey as filtered per the first 
survey question. Within a period of three weeks in 
March 2021, we collected in total 120 survey responses, 
of which 74 responses were fully answered. Within this 
research, we only report from the 74 full responses. 
Data Analysis. We utilized the survey for both 
model validation and exploration, by allowing users to 
add answers if they felt that our model did not account 
for their role, driver, interest, or blockchain feature. 
Based on our survey results, we identified stakeholder 
clusters and characterized them by allocating drivers 
and design features of our stakeholder map to these 
clusters. Thereby, a stakeholder is assigned to such a 
cluster if both associated actor types are embodied 
simultaneously. Further, we examined the proportional 
occurrence (percentage) of drivers, and a linear 
weighted importance rating scale regarding design 
features. We followed this approach to examine the root 
of stakeholder interests by evaluating the driving forces 
(motives, incentives) that cause individuals to partake in 
public blockchains in the first place, followed by their 
respective importance perception regarding the design 
features of such projects, i.e., how stakeholders expect 
such projects should be manifested. Supported by 
quantitative data, this method analyzes the interests of 
stakeholders in public blockchains (RQ2) in both a 
coherent and comparable manner. 
4. Results 
4.1 Stakeholder Map 
To identify the stakeholders of public blockchains 
(RQ1), and the interest of these stakeholders (RQ2), we 
synthesized our empirical insights in a stakeholder map 
(Figure 2.). It comprises three main entities: Blockchain 
(BC) Governance, Drivers, and BC Design Features, 
which we will detail in the following. The allocation of 
these identified aspects to stakeholders (based on our 
survey results) is covered in the subsequent sections. 




Figure 2. Stakeholder map
of which the BC Governance is part. Please note, that 
we are only able to show excerpts of the stakeholder 
map and our utilized sources here due to space 
limitations. The following descriptions are based on our 
qualitative data analysis. 
Blockchain Governance and Operations. To 
depict the involved parties of public blockchains, we 
enclosed its main stakeholders (RQ1) in the BC 
Governance frame. This entity further includes 
Operations and is itself embedded in the BC 
Environment. We found that core-team affiliates, 
system developers and validators are the bare minimum 
of required stakeholders for a public blockchain to 
operate. Through their participation, a first project 
instance gets initiated, the code on which the technical 
infrastructure is based is created and maintained, and 
transactions on the implemented protocol are validated. 
Upon operation, the utilization of such projects 
depends on its users and investors. The latter applies to 
individuals that are involved by possession and active 
trading of corresponding crypto assets. Whereas their 
participation is narrowed to these trades, users do make 
use of the provided blockchain-inherent functionalities 
(such as conducting payment transactions). 
All these stakeholder types contribute individual 
resources, and all these stakeholders strive to protect 
their interests. Financing, technical expertise, a broad 
user basis to establish network effects; they are all vital 
aspects for public blockchains. However, these projects 
only exist if their stakeholders find common ground. In 
this regard, besides the technical-based consensus 
protocols, there is no central instance that governs and 
attends to value distribution among these differently 
contributing stakeholders. To comprehend this delicate 
relationship, we use the entity Drivers to capture what 
are the incentives and motives that drives stakeholders 
to partake in public blockchains, and BC Design 
Features (refers to stakeholder interests) that describe 
realization aspects of these projects, whereby some of 
these aspects may come with certain trade-offs. 
Blockchain Environment. To contextualize the 
infrastructural setting of public blockchains, we 
outlined the BC Environment, which contains the BC 
Governance itself. From established structures, which 
we detail in the following, there are several emanating 
forces with the potential to influence or even determine 
the behavior of stakeholders. 
There are collections of stakeholders, that are part 
of an interest group and often partake in a project with 
the same activities, i.e., they contribute the same kind of 
resources. We label these units as coalitions (e.g., core-
development teams or mining pools). As they contribute 
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shared resources to a shared goal, they are characterized 
by their leverage power over independently acting 
stakeholders. We provide an example based on mining 
pools, as many public blockchains are (still) based on a 
proof-of-work consensus protocol. In mining pools, the 
joined computing power of validators leads to higher, 
steadier, and more predictable mining rewards as if the 
validators would act on their own. Such collectives of 
validators pursue several strategies to either increase 
these rewards or earn them instead of other competitors. 
These leveraging tactics, however, can form friction 
points with other stakeholders that are not contributing 
through validation, e.g., by leading to higher transaction 
fees, impaired security, or disputable amendments to the 
implementation (cf. the block-size dispute of BTC) [2, 
6]. This potential to undermine initial premises of public 
blockchains poses a viable threat for lasting consensus 
finding across all involved stakeholders [17, 18]. 
The organizational aspect of public blockchains is 
guided by decentralization, and we found the same for 
the aspect of communication. Interactive platforms, 
such as online forums, serve as important channels to 
distribute and broadcast information between different 
stakeholders. However, there are potential issues when 
certain platform members take an influential role and 
exploit their status and arise as so-called benevolent 
dictators. Newcomers of the blockchain market might 
inform themselves about their opportunities on such 
interactive platforms. There is a potential threat 
regarding scams, as fraudulent stakeholders take 
advantage of the existing naivety and ignorance of such 
stakeholders regarding blockchain technology. Some of 
these individuals might be prone to follow sudden 
(investment) trends, initiated or incited by demagogical 
figures on such platforms. Eventually, the sheer mass of 
such latently steered stakeholders might have a palpable 
influence on the crypto markets and thus the further 
development of public blockchains in general. 
There are several well-established complementors 
in the blockchain economy, mainly hardware and 
software providers, and marketplaces and exchanges. 
They show a multilayered influence and leverage on 
stakeholders, which we detail in the following. Taking 
up the example regarding public blockchains with a 
proof-of-work architecture, hardware providers profit 
from increasing technical standards of validation 
(mining) equipment, due to the high competition among 
stakeholders that contribute to projects by validating 
transactions. High-quality (i.e., the most efficient) 
hardware are rare and expensive, additionally, they are 
often specialized on a consensus protocol that is 
proprietary to just one or a few public blockchains. This 
potentially impairs the agility of validators to switch to 
different projects if the market changes. Moreover, the 
increasing complexity of setting up such hardware, 
combined with long delivery times and rapidly changing 
markets, sets the market entry barrier very high for new 
stakeholders who intend to contribute by validating 
transactions. Newly forming projects might therefore 
depend on already established networks of dedicated 
validators, who in turn depend on hardware providers. 
Marketplaces and exchanges, as well as wallet 
service providers provide the aspect of accessibility to 
the blockchain economy. Amongst others, they manage 
to attract newcomers by transforming crypto-based 
assets into convenient investment instruments. For the 
blockchain economy itself, one can argue this to be a 
double-edged sword. On the one hand, blockchain 
projects might struggle to acquire sufficient funding 
through investors. Eased access to invest (marketplaces 
and exchanges) and hold (wallet service providers) 
might help to reach a needed threshold. On the other 
hand, many of these attracted stakeholders might have 
little knowledge about their invested public blockchain 
projects, as they are presumably guided by (quick) 
profits only. 
Drivers. We use Drivers as an umbrella term for 
motives and incentives that drive stakeholders to 
participate in public blockchain projects. The aspects of 
this stakeholder map entity have a broad spectrum: they 
might originate from intrinsic (e.g., altruism) or 
extrinsic (fear of missing out) stimuli, are pecuniary 
(profit) or non-pecuniary (curiosity) based or grasp 
other existing behavioral forces. The further allocation 
of these aspects to stakeholders might reveal latent 
friction points in shared consensus finding, as mutual 
interests might not be rooted in the same rationale. 
BC Design Features. To meet the interests of the 
stakeholders, public blockchain projects can focus on 
various design features, such as data security & integrity 
or anonymity. There might be trade-offs between some 
of these aspects, for instance security must be weighed 
against efficiency. Our identified aspects in public 
blockchains recurrently form friction points among 
stakeholders. Initial promises, i.e., often the proprietary 
identity aspect of such projects, can be mirrored by these 
design features. Using Drivers to grasp the impulsions 
of stakeholders, the entity of BC Design Features serves 
as a common denominator across the entire spectrum of 
actors. Individuals who are different regarding their 
contribution towards a public blockchain (e.g., 
financial, know-how) can nonetheless gather around a 
key design feature that is equally important to all. 
4.2 Stakeholder Clusters 
In the previous chapter, we outlined a stakeholder 
map (Figure 2.), which is specifically tailored towards 
public blockchains. The allocation of identified aspects 
in that model to stakeholders is covered in this chapter, 
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based on the analysis of our survey results (n=74). In 
doing so, we identified the three main stakeholder 
clusters user-investor (41 out of n=74), user-validator 
(20 out of n=74), and validator-investor (18 out of 
n=74), which we will characterize in the following. A 
stakeholder is assigned to such a cluster if both 
associated actor types are embodied simultaneously 
(overlaps are possible). This approach leverages an 
analysis of drivers and interests in public and 
permissionless blockchains based entities with different 
contribution-profiles. The stakeholder clusters above 
describe the numerically most found constellations of 
different actor types in our dataset. The profiling of 
these stakeholder clusters is based on quantitative data, 
whose analysis we complied in two tables. Both list the 
respective results for every cluster in a separate column. 
Table 1. Driver distribution below shows the proportional 
occurrence of drivers, followed by the weighted 
importance ratings of design features that are comprised 
in Table 2. Interest distribution. 
user-investor. Behind this cluster are individuals 
who both use and invest in public blockchain projects. 
Profit drives 88% of these stakeholders to partake in 
such projects, followed by having an alternative to 
banks, curiosity (both 71%), independence (68%), and 
knowledge growth (66%). Altruism (27%), 
communication (27%), and own reputation (7%) are the 
least indicated motives in this cluster. The user-investor 
cluster prioritizes data security & integrity (4.82), 
scalability (4.41), and accessibility (4.30) as the top 
three rated design features. On the lower end of this 
rating are anonymity (3.58), data standardization (3.45), 
and regulatory status (3.38). 
user-validator. This cluster comprises individuals 
who both use public blockchain projects and validate 
transactions on implemented protocols of such projects. 
Stakeholders assigned to this cluster are 90% driven by 
profit, followed by independence (80%), curiosity , 
income (both 75%), ideology  and knowledge growth 
(both 70%). The least indicated drivers were altruism 
(30%), fear of missing out (20%), and own reputation 
(5%). Data security & integrity (4.85), on-chain 
decentralized governance (4.45), and scalability (4.35) 
are the top three prioritized design features for this 
stakeholder cluster, whereas automated conflict 
resolution (3.58), data standardization (3.45), and 
regulatory status (2.80) are perceived as least important. 
validator-investor. Individuals who both validate 
transactions on implemented protocols of public 
blockchain projects and invest in such projects are 
assigned to this cluster. As in the previous two clusters, 
profit (94%) is the most indicated driver. Further, 
curiosity , income (both 78%), general mistrust, 
ideology, independence, and knowledge growth (all 
67%) profile the validator-investor cluster. As in the 
previous cluster, the top three rated design features are 
data security & integrity (4.83), on-chain decentralized 
governance (4.33), and scalability (4.28). Anonymity 
(3.61), data standardization (3.50), regulatory status 
(2.83) are the lowest ranking aspects. As with the user-
validator cluster, altruism (28%), fear of missing out 
(22%), and own reputation (6%) are the drivers with the 
lowest proportional occurrence. 











affordability 54% 55% 61% 
alternative to bank 71% 60% 61% 
altruism 27% 30% 28% 
anonymity 54% 65% 61% 
avoid regulation / 
censorship 46% 45% 56% 
communication 27% 35% 39% 
curiosity 71% 75% 78% 
fear of missing out 37% 20% 22% 
general mistrust 56% 60% 67% 
ideology 63% 70% 67% 
income 46% 75% 78% 
independence 68% 80% 67% 
knowledge growth 66% 70% 67% 
novel store of 
value 51% 55% 50% 
own reputation 7% 5% 6% 
profit 88% 90% 94% 










accessibility 4.30 3.95 4.11 
agility 3.77 3.60 3.72 
anonymity 3.58 3.85 3.61 
approval speed 4.08 3.85 4.06 
automated conflict 
resolution 3.69 3.58 3.89 
data security & 
integrity 4.82 4.85 4.83 
data 








4.16 4.45 4.33 
scalability 4.41 4.35 4.28 
regulatory status 3.38 2.80 2.83 
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5. Discussion 
Section 4 showed our developed stakeholder map 
and exemplary survey results from its 
operationalization. To relate our findings to literature on 
blockchain stakeholders and blockchain governance, a 
wider discussion follows. We elaborate our key findings 
in the paragraphs Context and Stakeholders of Public 
Blockchains, Dual Roles of Stakeholders, and Shared 
Intentions, Shared Consensus?, and Generalizing 
Blockchain Stakeholders. 
Context and Stakeholders of Public Blockchains. 
Stakeholder analysis is a powerful tool in the corporate 
domain to better understand and, consequently, align 
project stakeholders so that a common goal can be 
achieved (i.e., [19]). As such, stakeholder analysis tools 
help us to identify a given context to which appropriate 
governance measures, such as structures or 
mechanisms, can be developed (i.e., the COBIT 
framework for IT governance [20]). As we argue in our 
related work, blockchains combine both the mutual 
dependency of actors to maintain and run the system 
while, at the same time, avoiding centralized governors 
to, instead, rely on encoded incentives or coordination 
processes. This renders stakeholder analysis tools from 
the corporate domain inappropriate [21]. If a central 
governor is missing, it would be reasonable to assume 
that central stakeholders in blockchain systems are 
understood in depth. But, while first steps have been 
made in terms of actor [12] or role specification (i.e., 
[22]), the blockchain governance literature seems to be 
lacking an in-depth understanding on stakeholders of 
public blockchains. Consequently, the context against 
which governance measures are supposed to be 
developed, remains unclear. This can also be seen on 
various large so-called decentralized autonomous 
organizations (DAOs), which are instances of public 
blockchain systems. Several of these DAOs received 
significant funding (over several hundred million of 
USD in several cases [21]) to build their technology and 
governance structures, but, without live systems and 
users in practice, stakeholder interests remain blurred. 
Against this background, our research has shown that 
studying these stakeholders in-depth can yield an 
interesting picture: studying actor roles, their drivers 
(what is the root of the stakeholder’s intentions?), and 
interests in design features (concrete manifestation 
options that can be weighed off) enables a more realistic 
stakeholder analysis, and, consequently, allows for 
better stakeholder management.  
Dual Roles of Stakeholders. Our findings have also 
shown that stakeholders in public blockchain systems 
seem to inhere various roles at the same time, which 
extends current research [12]. Indeed, most survey 
respondents saw themselves as fulfilling at least two 
types of roles, which led to three stakeholder clusters 
within this research. Interestingly, all respondents 
within these clusters indicated to be primarily driven by 
profit. It can be assumed, that such stakeholders might 
be inclined to withdraw their capital, if a more profitable 
opportunity arises. This is significant, because invested 
capital in blockchain projects determines a token’s 
value, which, in turn, serves as a compensation for 
blockchain validators. If a token value decreases, miners 
might step away that, eventually, may render a 
blockchain system less secure due to lower hash rates or 
a higher degree of centralization (e.g., [23]). To add to 
this line of thought, our results also show that the user-
investor cluster in particular is characterized by the fear 
of missing out on current trends. As a third exemplary 
finding, our results indicate that the user-validator 
cluster is primarily driven by the thought of being 
independent, which is also line with their, in comparison 
to the other identified clusters, higher rating of ideology. 
Overall, this may indicate a widening gap between 
differently contributing stakeholders. Their 
commitment, and therefore the willingness to contribute 
resources, may strongly differ in uncertain but decisive 
times, like sudden price movements or regulation. 
Shared Intentions, Shared Consensus? For 
another, in this research, we were introducing 
blockchain design features, i.e., interests of public 
blockchain stakeholders regarding blockchain 
technology, and related these to our derived stakeholder 
clusters. In our related work, we introduced the paradox 
of openness [10], which aims at enabling a maximum 
openness for mutual innovation, while ensuring value 
and interest safeguarding for all involved stakeholders. 
Against this background, we see a need for a coherent, 
preliminary identification of interests, attributed to 
distinctive stakeholder clusters. However, the question 
remains, if there is more between shared 
expectations/intentions/design features, i.e., alleged 
shared consensus, and the realization of such visions? 
For example, are projects failing because of the forces 
of the BC Environment in stakeholders, i.e., not between 
the forces within the BC Governance frame? Or perhaps 
different stakeholders still imagine something different 
under a concept that is considered equally important, 
such as data security and integrity, or scalability? Our 
insights indicate that stakeholder groups have distinct 
interests. Data security and integrity is the highest rated 
BC design feature across all stakeholder clusters. Their 
subsequent prioritization, however, differ. For instance, 
scalability and accessibility are among the three core 
interests of the user-investor cluster. Stakeholders who 
we assigned to a cluster with a validator component, do, 
however, perceive decentralized on-chain governance 
as second most important aspect, followed by 
scalability. 
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Consequently, our results indicate that stakeholders 
appreciate the possibility of raising their voice via votes 
(common via, for example, smart contracts or systems 
utilizing Proof-of-Stake). However, their participation 
in ongoing developments should be channeled to where 
their actual interest lies, which would require an 
improved communication concept among stakeholders. 
Generalizing Blockchain Stakeholders. Lastly, 
comparing our identified stakeholder clusters to the ones 
of related work (such as the value-based stakeholder 
groups from Wingreen et al. [16]), we conclude that our 
newly developed framework allows for a more precise 
representation. We conclude that such clusters should be 
defined according to embodied actor types (or roles, 
such as validator), as we did in this research, instead of 
collating value expectations and a priori label such 
groups as stakeholder clusters. To counteract the 
generalization and oversimplification of stakeholder 
communities in academia, we see this approach as 
crucial, namely the consideration of contributing roles 
(actor types) of individuals in the blockchain 
infrastructure (seen as a platform economy) during the 
process of stakeholder analysis. We see our framework 
as a contribution in form of an applicable tool to 
evaluate primary interests of stakeholders (alongside 
their rationale behind the prioritization) in public and 
permissionless blockchains. Consequently, in the 
overarching process of analyzing the alignment of 
deviating incentives and interests, our framework could 
be used as a very first instance to capture these aspects 
and assign them to stakeholder clusters (which are 
defined by their contribution to the project) in a coherent 
and uniform approach.  
We are aware that different application areas of 
(public) blockchain systems, as for instance described 
by Schlegel et al. [15], might infer different 
prioritizations of aspects per use case. However, our 
framework captures the aspects that are very essential 
and characteristic for pubic blockchains in the first 
place. Accordingly, the evaluated interests per 
stakeholder cluster must be understood as such, i.e., not 
as a manifestation and outline of a specific blockchain 
application. We argue that this approach should enable 
a general classification of public blockchains in the 
context of decentralized collaboration, and, hence, point 
out the primary interests of different stakeholder 
clusters, as they fundamentally shape such projects. The 
assimilation of these insights might enable a further 
assessment of blockchains in terms of its eventual 
capacity to allow for decentralized collaboration. 
6. Conclusion 
In the context of blockchain governance, we 
developed a framework (stakeholder map) that captures 
the interests (reflected in BC Design Features), as well 
as motives and incentives (Drivers) of stakeholders in 
public and permissionless blockchain projects. We 
operationalized this framework and conducted the 
resulting survey on several online platforms to gather 
data from communities of current public blockchains. 
Our analysis of this data yielded three main stakeholder 
clusters: user-investor, user-validator, and validator-
investor. As such, this research provides a novel tool for 
stakeholder analysis in academia and practice to 
improve blockchain governance. 
Alongside the identification of shared interests, 
such as data security and integrity, we found that every 
stakeholder cluster can be distinctively characterized in 
terms of what drives these individuals to participate in 
public blockchains in the first place. This highlights that 
differently contributing stakeholders, even though they 
might show mutual interests, are not homogenously 
embedded in our outlined stakeholder map. This 
indicates a possible widening gap between such 
individuals, for example, regarding their level of 
commitment to the projects they are involved in. To 
utilize blockchain technology by the means of 
collaboration in a decentralized manner, these insights 
must be considered. 
From a methodological standpoint, this research 
must admit several limitations. Since we did not have 
the (technical) possibility to backtrack the survey 
responses to their publication source, the results might 
be skewed towards a rather distinctive community, e.g., 
if most of the survey responses originated form a single 
online platform dedicated to a single, rather unique (and 
thus not representative) public blockchain project. We 
were aware of this issue and strived for an adequately 
broad distribution of the survey. Furthermore, we were 
not able to analyze the (primary) interests of certain 
actors in our framework, as there were not enough 
responses in this regard to conduct a sophisticated data 
analysis. Even though we strove to justify our applied 
methods, we are aware that, for example, the applied 
equations and methods in our conducted data analysis 
form only a small fraction of all possible approaches. 
Based on our research, we see several possible 
future research opportunities. For one, a further 
classification of our identified drivers based on 
psychological heuristics could reveal additional insights 
regarding the behavioral and motivational rationale of 
stakeholders in public blockchains. An example would 
be the examination of the overjustification effect, by 
differentiating between intrinsic and extrinsic drivers. 
For another, one could focus on the dynamics of our 
outlined stakeholder map. For example, which criteria 
are crucial, which interests must be met or undercut that 
a certain stakeholder participates or abandons a 
blockchain project? Lastly, our developed framework 
Page 6101
could form the basis for an even more sophisticated 
approach to capture the interests of stakeholders in 
public and permissionless blockchain projects. 
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